[Fwd: Holley Says Baker Trade Doesn't Compute]

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Baker: It still doesn't compute


By Michael Holley, Globe Columnist, 7/31/2002

Nine days later and the Vin Baker deal still is there, mischievously
tugging at my mind. Trades aren't supposed to work this way, are they?
You want a trade that you quickly can analyze, not one that Greco-Roman
wrestles with you for more than a week.

 When the Celtics traded Andrew DeClercq and an unprotected lottery pick
(Andre Miller) to the Cavaliers for Vitaly Potapenko, everyone - with
the exception of a guy named Rick - knew the Celtics got swindled. Two
months earlier, it was the other way around. Boston gave up Travis
Knight and received Tony Battie.

Now there is Baker and Shammond Williams for Potapenko, Kenny Anderson,
and Joseph Forte. If we could reduce the trade to those five names,
things would be simpler. But you can't talk about this deal without
mentioning why it was made. And once you do that, you'll find yourself
wondering if Larry Bird was right when he said Paul Gaston's ownership
philosophy reminded him of the Clippers'.

Let's start with the deal itself. The logical question everyone should
ask on trade day is this: ''Did this trade make my team better?'' That
answer has to be positive on Day One. In some cases, the first day of
the trade is going to be the best day of the trade. At the very least,
your version of the New Deal should look good on paper.

Well, if you're from Seattle, the answer is a decisive ''Yes.'' In
Boston, the most honest and optimistic response is ''Maybe.''

The Celtics' major losses were their starting point guard, about $9
million of salary cap relief in 2003, and a 21-year-old prospect whose
wardrobe - a Scooby Doo dress shirt, Joseph? - was questioned more than
his ability. Ask the Sonics and they'll tell you they lost nothing. They
wanted out of Baker's contract, and Williams wasn't going to play much
for them.

If Baker stood 6 feet 6 inches and had an $86 million contract, he might
still be in Washington. But NBA general managers mete out more second
and third chances than any other executives in America, and they are
often attracted to 6-11 forwards who used to be All-Stars. That's part
of the package that lured Chris Wallace. The Celtics GM says Baker
doesn't have to be Boston's best player; he simply has to be a threat to
score 20 points now and then, and be a serviceable presence in the
paint.

That makes sense to me, but what I don't understand is why the Celtics
have to pay someone more than $12 million per season to fill that job
description. By 2006, the Celtics will have paid Baker more than $50
million, or more than twice as much as Rodney Rogers would have
commanded in a four-year contract.

And this is Gaston's idea of saving money?

Remember, part of Wallace's attraction was the hope that Baker somehow
can recapture his All-Star form from 1998. The other part of the deal
was financial, and it's insulting when you consider what the savings
are.

With the five-player swap, the Celtics saved about $1 million and took a
small step away from a bogeyman (the luxury tax) that no one has seen
yet.

We get this forced dealmaking and penny-pinching from an organization
that saw its net income rise $10 million from March 2001 to March 2002.
This from an organization that got a multimillion gift from heaven when
Rick Pitino decided to leave $20-plus million on their table and return
to a place where his name isn't used in vain. This from an organization
that has paid its chief financial officer, Richard Pond, a total of
$850,000 in bonuses from 1999-2001 - all nonplayoff seasons. This from
an organization that still averaged more than 16,000 fans in 1996-97,
the worst season in its history.

Luxury tax? Gaston's existence as an owner here has been so blessed that
he should volunteer to pay any tax that comes his way. If he cared about
putting a team back in the Eastern Conference finals and beyond, he
would have allowed his basketball people to sign Rogers, tax be damned.
Instead, because of a few dollars, we have this strange timeline:

The Celtics trade Joe Johnson, a No. 1 pick, and two reserves to the
Suns for Rogers and Tony Delk;

Everyone agrees that it is a fine trade if Rogers can be re-signed in
the summer;

Rogers is offered a massive paycut in the summer and cannot be
re-signed;

The Celtics then pursue a trade for Baker, a 30-year-old forward with a
huge contract and a reputation for taking nights off when he is
scheduled to work. Somehow this is perceived as a corporate bargain.

What it all means is that the Celtics traded Johnson and Casey Jacobsen
for Delk. It means that the Celtics have held the rights to eight
first-round picks since 1997, and they have turned them into Paul
Pierce, Eric Williams (whom they originally drafted in 1995), Delk,
Shammond Williams and Baker.

Not bad. Not great, either.

I continue to wrestle because things could work out, basketballwise.
Baker could dominate again inside, Pierce could continue his
inside-outside mastery, and Antoine Walker could return to town with a
consisent midrange game. They all could share the ball beautifully, and
Battie-Baker-Walker-Pierce could become one of the most effective
quartets in the East.

But, needlessly, the Celtics went away from what they knew they had and
went with something they could have, if their world spins perfectly.
They traded picks in the winter so they could win in the spring. That's
good. They made a trade this summer so they can save a few cents in the
fall. That's ridiculous.

If the owner keeps this up, I say a trade is the last thing he needs to
make his life easier. A sale would seem more practical.

Michael Holley is a Globe columnist. His e-mail address is
holley@globe.com.

This story ran on page D1 of the Boston Globe on 7/31/2002.